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Abstract: We study the impact of timing and commitment on adaptation and mitigation policies in the
context of international environmental problems. Adaptation policies present the characteristics of a private
good and may require a prior investment, while mitigation policies produce a public good. By developing a
stylized model, where some countries coordinate their actions while others do not, we evaluate the impact
of strategic commitment and leadership considerations on abatement and adaptation levels, global and indi-
vidual emissions and environmental costs. Crucially, global and individual environmental costs suffered by
countries are found to be greater when adaptation measures can be used strategically.
Key Words: Adaptation, climate change, leadership, mitigation, strategy, timing.
Re´sume´ : Nous e´tudions l’impact de la se´quence des de´cisions sur les politiques d’adaptation et de re´duction
des e´missions dans le contexte des proble`mes environnementaux internationaux. Alors que les politiques
d’adaptation pre´sentent les caracte´ristiques d’un bien prive´ et peuvent ne´cessiter un investissement pre´alable,
les politiques de re´duction des e´missions produisent un bien public. En de´veloppant un mode`le stylise´,
ou` certains pays coordonnent leurs actions tandis que d’autres ne le font pas, nous e´valuons l’impact de
l’engagement strate´gique et du leadership sur le niveau d’adaptation et de re´duction de la pollution, sur
les e´missions globales et individuelles, et sur les couˆts environnementaux. Nous constatons que les couˆts
environnementaux subis par les pays sont plus e´leve´s lorsque les mesures d’adaptation peuvent eˆtre utilise´es
de manie`re strate´gique.
Acknowledgments: Research supported by SSHRC Canada.
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1 Introduction
One of the consequences of climate change is the increasing frequency of extreme weather events occurring
around the globe. Unusually high rainfall is becoming a significant cause of floods, as for example in 2013 in
Alberta (Canada) and in Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and France. On the other hand, droughts
are becoming longer, harsher and more frequent, as experienced for instance in 2012 in many U.S. states and
in Russia, England and Wales.
To limit climate change, it has been suggested that countries need both to reduce their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions substantially and sustainably, and to invest in adaptive measures (see the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (2014), the European Commission Climate Action
(2015), and President Barack Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan). Mitigation policies consist in any means to
cut down GHG emissions, from reducing deforestation and investing in new clean technologies and renewable
energies, to changing consumer behavior; their aim is to prevent the adverse consequences of climate change by
reducing its rate and magnitude. Mitigation policies find their roots in the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and in all the ensuing UN Climate Change Conferences. However, the
effectiveness of mitigation policies is limited by two factors. The first one, called climate inertia, is intrinsic
to the climate system itself. Climate inertia refers to the long period required to reach a new climate system
equilibrium after the stabilization of the atmospheric concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The
second factor is related to the relatively small number of countries committed to GHG emissions reduction,
and to the limited extent of their reductions. On the other hand, adaptation policies are designed to alleviate
the damages if the adverse consequences of climate change (floods, droughts, heat waves) should materialize.
Adaptation policies can take many different forms, such as early warning systems, sea walls, flood levees,
irrigation systems, or the development of new crop varieties adapted to drought or changes in temperature.
Although adaptation and mitigation policies are both answers to the risks of climate change, they show
some important differences. The first one is the time scale of their impact: while adaptation has the potential
to reduce the risks of climate change over the next few decades, mitigation has relatively little influence on
climate outcomes over this time scale. The second difference lies in the nature of the investment, where
adaptation shows all the characteristics of a private good (with costs and benefits sustained and enjoyed by
the individual country that adopts it), while mitigation presents all the features of a public good, including
the risk of free-riding.
In line with the IPCC Fifth assessment report statement that “adaptation and mitigation are complemen-
tary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change” (IPCC (2014), page 76), in this paper,
we study countries’ decisions about adaptation and mitigation expenditures, under different assumptions on
commitment and timing. In particular, we consider the cases where investments in adaptation measures can
be made prior to or simultaneously with mitigation decisions, and the cases where a group of countries can
take leadership in environmental measures by making prior commitments.
The literature on adaptation (or self-protection) and mitigation (or abatement) has developed in several
directions.1 A first group of papers analyzes the relationship between adaptation and mitigation policies,
that is, whether and when they are substitutes or complements (see, e.g., Ingham et al. (2005), Yohe and
Strzepek (2007) and Lecocq and Shalizi (2007)). Other authors focus on how the introduction of adaptive
measures against climate change affects the stable size of international environmental agreements (IEA)
aimed at reducing GHG emissions (see, e.g., Barrett (2008), Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011) and Buob and
Siegenthaler (2011)). A third stream of the literature studies the optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation
policies as responses to the effects of climate change (see, e.g., Kane and Shogren (2000), Tulkens and van
Steenberghe (2009), Bre´chet et al. (2013) and Farnham and Kennedy (2014)).
Some of these topics have been further developed by explicitly including the timing of decisions in the
problem setting. The idea that investments in self-protecting measures against climate change can be made
at different moments in time finds its rationale in the IPCC third, fourth and fifth Assessment Reports
(IPCC (2001), IPCC (2007) and IPCC (2014)) where reactive adaptation (e.g., providing emergency shelters,
1For a recent survey please refer to Agrawala et al. (2011).
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alternative sources of power, sandbags or any other form of help in the event of floods) is distinguished from
proactive adaptation (e.g., the implementation of early warning systems for floods). This concept of ex-post
and ex-ante adaptation is considered in Smith and Lenhart (1996), Fankhauser et al. (1999), Mendelsohn
(2000) and Lecoq and Shalizi (2007). It is however important to notice that although the distinction between
reactive and anticipative adaptation appears clear, it is difficult to delineate it with precision in a dynamic
context such as climate change.
Papers that clearly mention the timing of investments in adaptive measures against climate change include
De Bruin et al. (2011), where the level of proactive adaptation is chosen before solving the emissions game in
the context of IEA, and Buob and Stephan (2011) and Ebert and Welsch (2012), where adaptation is timed
after mitigation in the context of determining the optimal mix between the two environmental policies.
By analyzing the impact of different strategic commitments to adaptation, that is, by focusing on the
consequences of the timing of adaptive investments with respect to mitigation decisions, our paper is close in
spirit to the one by Zehaie (2009), as we share a similar research question. Indeed, Zehaie (2009) considers
three different time sequences of decision, namely, the decision about adaptation is made before, after and
simultaneously with mitigation.2 In a two-country model, the equilibrium levels of adaptation under full
cooperation, noncooperation and semi-cooperation are computed for each case. Two main results are derived:
firstly, when adaptation is decided on before mitigation, this generates a strategic effect so that one country
passes on some costs of mitigation to the other country. Secondly, the highest level of self-protection is
obtained in the semi-cooperative case with precommitted adaptation, followed by the noncooperative case,
also with precommitted adaptation, then by the noncooperative case with simultaneous decisions, and finally
by the first-best solution.
The aim of our paper is to study the strategic consequences of commitment and timing by considering
two types of adaptive investments: the ones that require some prior commitment, and the ones that can
be carried out simultaneously with mitigation decisions. In particular, we want to understand the impact
of commitment and timing on mitigation and adaptation levels, total emissions, and global and individual
environmental costs. In order to do this, we develop a multiple country model where agents minimize
their environmental cost by choosing their adaptation and mitigation expenditures, and where a subset of
countries of arbitrary size collaborate to reduce pollution emissions. Furthermore, we examine the case
where collaborating countries become leaders in environmental policies while non-collaborating countries act
as followers.3
The main results of our paper are the following: a greater environmental cost is suffered when countries
commit to investments in adaptive measures before they decide about mitigation measures; when adaptation
investments are made before the mitigation decisions, countries can take advantage of a strategic effect and
increase adaptation to reduce their mitigation effort; and, finally, leadership in responding to the effects of
climate change is not beneficial from an aggregate point of view, but it is convenient for the countries that
become leaders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 computes the
equilibrium levels of all variables for the two types of adaptive investments; prior (Section 3.1) and concurrent
(Section 3.2) adaptation. Section 4 performs the same analysis for the case where collaborating countries
take the leadership in responding to climate change effects. Section 5 outlines the special singular type cases
with only collaborating countries (Section 5.1) and only non-collaborating countries (Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 draws the main conclusions.
2 The model
We consider n symmetric countries, each of which produces an economic output denoted by oj . The produc-
tion activity carried out by a country, in addition to generating economic value, creates emissions according to
2The case of adaptation decisions timed after mitigation decisions is shown to be equivalent to the one where the two
environmental policies are decided on simultaneously.
3The idea of leadership is also present in Eisenack and Ka¨hler (2012), where adaptation and mitigation decisions are made
simultaneously. They extend the paper by Ebert and Welsch (2012).
Les Cahiers du GERAD G–2016–04 3
the relationship ej = αjoj , where αj is a parameter related to the cleanliness of the production technologies
used by country j. We normalize αjoj = 1 for each j, so that the optimal emissions of each country when
there is no environmental concern is equal to 1. Pollution reduces the welfare (e.g., losses in productivity) of
each country, and this reduction is increasing and convex in total GHG emissions, denoted by E.
Countries can respond to the effects of climate change caused by pollution with two different environmental
policies. The first one is called adaptation and it consists in investing in some form of private measures to
counteract the consequences of climate change (dams, diversion canals, irrigation, crop diversification). This
policy reduces the country’s vulnerability to pollution but does not change the pollution level, so that each
country’s environmental vulnerability is given by
vj = E − bj
where bj measures the reduction in the level of pollution that has a negative impact on the welfare.
The cost of adaptation for country j is an increasing convex function of bj , assumed quadratic, that is,
γA
2
b2j
where γA > 0 is the adaptation cost coefficient.
The second environmental policy is called mitigation and it consists of any means aimed at curtailing a
country’s GHG emissions ej (filters, catalytic converters, expanded forests, etc.). Mitigation is represented
by the variable
mj = 1− ej
where mj is the reduction in the country’s emissions with respect to the base level of 1. The cost of mitigation
for country j is an increasing convex function of mj , assumed quadratic, that is,
γM
2
m2j
where γM > 0 is the mitigation cost coefficient.
Contrary to self-protective adaptation measures, mitigation has the characteristics of a public good, so
that the total pollution from all countries is given by
E =
n∑
j=1
(1−mj) .
The overall environmental cost for a representative country j is thus given by
zj =
γE
2
(E − bj)2 + γM
2
m2j +
γA
2
b2j (1)
where γE > 0 is the environmental sensitivity. The objective of a country j is to choose the mitigation and
adaptation levels that minimize the environmental cost zj .
Note that the numeraire can be chosen so that γM = 1 and the total environmental cost is expressed in
terms of the mitigation cost coefficient. In this numeraire, the environmental sensitivity is ω ≡ γEγM > 0. We
then use the change of variable aj = ωbj for the adaptation investment decision, and the cost function for a
representative country j can then be equivalently expressed as
cj =
ω
2
E2 − Eaj + 1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j (2)
where θ ≡ γM γA+γEγ2E > 0 is a parameter accounting for the impact of adaptive measures on both the
adaptation and environmental costs.
The optimization problem for country j is then
min
mj ,aj
cj =
ω
2
E2 − Eaj + 1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j (3)
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with
E =
n∑
j=1
(1−mj) = n−mj −
∑
k 6=j
mk.
Note that θω = γA+γEγE > 1, which ensures that the cost function of an individual country, given the
environmental strategies of the other countries, is strictly convex.
Although countries are symmetric with respect to their baseline output and cost parameters, we assume
that they do not have the same attitude towards environmental problems. Indeed, we distinguish between
two groups of countries. In the first group, countries agree to coordinate their environmental policies by
minimizing their joint total environmental cost, and we call them coordinating countries. Because of the
symmetry assumption, joint decisions are identical across coordinating countries. The second group is made
up of countries that establish their environmental policies by minimizing their own individual overall envi-
ronmental cost, and we call them individualistic countries. In the sequel, variables pertaining to coordinating
countries are indexed by C, while those pertaining to non-coordinating countries are indexed by I. The
proportion of coordinating countries is given by p, and the proportion of individualistic countries is denoted
q ≡ 1− p.
3 Types of adaptation
In order to address the strategic role of timing and commitment to environmental policies, we consider in
this section two different assumptions about the sequence of decisions made by countries. Under the first
assumption, countries commit to self-protective adaptation measures before deciding on their mitigation
levels; this commitment may be taken for strategic reasons, or may be due to the fact that adaptation
requires a prior investment. Under the second assumption, there is no prior commitment by countries to
adaptation, which then plays no strategic role since it results in a private good.
3.1 Adaptation as a prior investment
We first analyze the situation in which adaptation requires a prior investment, and mitigation decisions are
dependent on adaptation choices that have been committed to by players. This is modelled as a two-stage
game solved by backward induction.
Starting from the second stage mitigation game, a representative coordinating country solves
min
mC
cC =
{
ω
2
(n− npmC −MI)2 − (n− npmC −MI) aC + 1
2
m2C +
θ
2
a2C
}
where MI denotes the total mitigation effort of non-coordinating players, and aC denotes the joint adaptation
decision of coordinating countries. From the first-order condition we derive the reaction function
mPNrC (MI , aC) =
n2pω
n2p2ω + 1
− npω
n2p2ω + 1
MI − np
n2p2ω + 1
aC . (4)
Start with np+ 1 players cooperating in the adaptation game, and np in the mitigation game.
d
dm
(
ω
2
(n− npm−MI)2 − (n− npm−MI −mD) aC + 1
2
m2 +
θ
2
a2C
)
mC = − 1
n2p2ω + 1
(
npaC − n2pω + npω (MI +mD)
)
For a representative non-coordinating country, the optimization problem to solve is given by
min
mIj
cIj =
{
ω
2
(n−mIj − npmC −MI−j)2 − (n−mIj − npmC −MI−j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +
θ
2
a2Ij
}
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where MI−j denotes the total mitigation effort by the other non-coordinating countries. The corresponding
reaction function is given by
mPNrIj
(
mC , AI , aIj
)
=
nω
nqω + 1
− npω
nqω + 1
mC +
ω
nqω + 1
AI − aIj
For the non-coordinating countries:
d
dm
(
ω
2
(n−m− npmC − (nq − 1)mI −mD)2 − (n−m− npmC −MJ −mD) aI + 1
2
m2 +
θ
2
a2I
)
=
m+ aI +mω − nω + ωMJ + ωmD + npωmC =
m+ aI +mω − nω + ω (nq − 2)m+ ωmD + npωmC = 0, Solution is:
mI = − 1−ω + nqω + 1 (aI − nω + ωmD + npωmC)
For the deviating country:
d
dm
(
ω
2
(n−m− npmC −MI)2 − (n−m− npmC −MI) aI + 1
2
m2 +
θ
2
a2I
)
=
m+ aI +mω − nω + ωMI + npωmC = 0, Solution is:
mD = − 1
ω + 1
(aD − nω + ωmI (nq − 1) + npωmC)
Equilibrium solution:
mD = − 1
ω + 1
(aD − nω + ωmI (nq − 1) + npωmC)
mI = − 1−ω + nqω + 1 (aI − nω + ωmD + npωmC)
mC = − 1
n2p2ω + 1
(
npaC − n2pω + npω ((nq − 1)mI +mD)
)
where AI denotes the total adaptation by non-cooperating countries, and aIj is the adaptation decision of
non-coordinating country j. This reaction function presents the same characteristics as (4): it is negatively
related to coordinating countries’ mitigation and to its own adaptation. Moreover, it is positively related
to the adaptation of the other non-coordinating countries, as an increase in the other countries’ adaptation
expenditures leads to an increase in the total pollution.
The solution of the second-stage mitigation game is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium given by the
simultaneous solution of the reaction functions, that is:
mPNsC (aC , AI) = np
nω − (nqω + 1) aC + ωAI
n2p2ω + nqω + 1
(5)
mPNsIj (aC , AI , aIj) =
nω + n2p2ωaC + ωAI
n2p2ω + nqω + 1
− aIj . (6)
Note that the equilibrium mitigation decisions depend on the investment in adaptation measures from both
types of countries, so it is interesting to understand how these decisions are affected by changes in adaptation
policies. For example, if collaborating countries jointly increase their investment in adaptive measures, this
allows them to decrease their mitigation effort, as they become less vulnerable to the negative impact of
pollution. The same increase in adaptive measures makes the individualists’ mitigation task more difficult,
as an increase in emissions from coordinating countries hurts non-coordinators, which are forced to give
a stronger response in terms of emissions reduction. In the same way, when a non-coordinating country
unilaterally increases its adaptation investment, this leads to a decrease in the mitigation effort of that
country and to an increase in the mitigation effort of all the others. This shows how both types of countries,
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by choosing their adaptive measures in the first stage, can strategically affect the result of the mitigation
game.4
The total emissions for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium are given by
EPNs (aC , AI) =
n+ n2p2aC +AI
n2p2ω + nqω + 1
, (7)
where it is apparent that an increase in adaptive measures against climate change leads to an increase in total
emissions. Notice that total emissions are negatively related to the environmental sensitivity parameter ω.
In the first stage, players take into account the Nash equilibrium solutions (5), (6), (7), and a representative
coordinating country computes its investment in adaptation by solving
min
aC
cC =
{ω
2
(
EPNs (aC , AI)
)2 − (EPNs (aC , AI)) aC + 1
2
(
mPNsC (aC , AI)
)2
+
θ
2
a2C
}
.
From the first-order condition, we derive the reaction function
aPNrC (AI) =
(
n2p2ω + 1
)
(nqω + 1) (AI + n)
θ (n2p2ω + nqω + 1)
2 − n2p2 (n2p2ω − n2q2ω2 + 1) , (8)
which is positively related to the adaptation effort of non-coordinating countries, meaning that preventative
actions taken against the countries’ impact on climate change are strategic complements.
A representative non-coordinating country chooses its adaptation level by solving
min
aIj
cIj =
{ω
2
(
EPNs (aC , AI)
)2 − (EPNs (aC , AI)) aIj + 1
2
(
mPNsIj (aC , AI , aIj)
)2
+
θ
2
a2Ij
}
.
From the first-order conditions, we find a similar complementarity in the reaction of non-coordinating coun-
tries to the adaptation commitment of collaborating countries, that is,
aPNrI (aC) =
n (ω + 1)
(
np2aC + 1
) (
n2p2ω + nqω + 1− ω)
θ (n2p2ω + nqω + 1)
2
+ ω (n2p2ω + 1) (n2p2 + nq − 1)− nq (n2p2ω + nqω + 1) . (9)
The solution of the system (8)-(9) gives the equilibrium solution of the whole game:
aPNC = n
ω2 (Y + 1) (X + 1) (X + Y − ω + θW )
K1
aPNI = n
ω (ω + 1) (W − ω) (θωW +XY )
K1
mPNC = n
2pω2W (θω − 1) X + Y − ω + θW
K1
mPNI = nωW (θω − 1)
XY + θωW
K1
where
X = n2p2ω (10)
Y = nqω (11)
W = X + Y + 1 (12)
K1 = θ
2ω2W 3 + ω (X + 1) (X −Wθω) (ω −X − Y )
−W (XY 2 + θω ((Y + 1) (X + Y ) +X (X − Y 2)))
> 0.
A comparison between coordinators and individualists shows that, when adaptive measures are a prior in-
vestment with respect to mitigation levels, a collaborating country always adapts and mitigates more than
a non-collaborating country, and therefore suffers a greater environmental cost (aPNC > a
PN
I , m
PN
C > m
PN
I ,
cPNC > c
PN
I ).
4A similar strategic effect is found in Zehaie (2009).
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3.2 Adaptation as a concurrent investment
We now study the case where adaptation and mitigation decisions are made concurrently by the players.
This means that a representative collaborator solves
min
mC ,aC
cC =
{
ω
2
(n− npmC −MI)2 − (n− npmC −MI) aC + 1
2
m2C +
θ
2
a2C
}
yielding the first-order conditions{
mC =
n2pω
n2p2ω+1 − npωn2p2ω+1MI − npn2p2ω+1aC
aC =
n−npmC−MI
θ
.
Note that the optimal expenditure in adaptive measures is proportional to the total emissions.5
By solving the FOCs above we derive the reaction functions of collaborating countries as
mSNrC (MI) =
np (θω − 1) (n−MI)
θ + n2p2 (θω − 1)
aSNrC (MI) =
n−MI
θ + n2p2 (θω − 1)
which clearly shows that mitigation decisions are still strategic substitutes between the two types of countries.
A representative non-coordinating country solves the optimization problem
min
mIj ,aIj
cIj =
{ω
2
(n−mIj − npmC −MI−j)2 − (n−mIj − npmC −MI−j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +
θ
2
a2Ij
}
(13)
with first-order conditions {
mI =
nω
nqω+1 − npωnqω+1mC − 1nqω+1aI
aI =
n−npmC−MI
θ .
The reaction functions are then
mSNrI (mC) =
n (θω − 1) (1− pmC)
θ + nq (θω − 1)
aSNrI (mC) =
n (1− pmC)
θ + nq (θω − 1) .
Examining the reaction functions we find that adaptation decisions no longer play any strategic role. As in
the prior-commitment case, mitigation decisions by the two types of countries are strategic complements; in
addition, adaptation decisions are also strategic complements to the mitigation decisions of the other players.
The solution of the whole game is then given by
mSNC =
n2p (θω − 1)
θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1)
mSNI =
n (θω − 1)
θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1)
aSNC = a
SN
I =
n
θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1)
ESN =
nθ
θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1)
cSNC =
n2 (θω − 1) (θ + n2p2 (θω − 1))
2 (θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1))2
cSNI =
n2 (θω − 1) (θ + θω − 1)
2 (θ + n (q + np2) (θω − 1))2 .
5This is similar to what was found in Ebert and Welsch (2012) for welfare maximization by one country.
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A comparison between coordinating and non-coordinating countries yields that, when adaptation and mitiga-
tion are established at the same time, coordinators and individualists allocate the same amount of resources to
adaptation (aSNC = a
SN
I ), as adaptive expenditures are private investments proportional to total emissions.
There is no strategic effect of adaptation policies between the two groups of countries. However, relative
to the mitigation policy, individualistic countries take advantage of the positive externality generated by
collaborators and mitigate less (mSNC > m
SN
I ). This generates a lower mitigation cost and, consequently,
non-collaborating countries suffer a smaller environmental cost than do collaborating countries (cSNI < c
SN
C ).
4 Leadership in environmental policies
We consider again the two types of adaptive investments but we now introduce the hypothesis that coordi-
nating countries act as leaders in both mitigation and adaptation decisions while non-coordinating countries
behave as followers.
4.1 Adaptation as a prior investment
In this case we assume that countries commit to adaptation before mitigation, and that coordinating countries
act as leaders, both for adaptation and mitigation decisions. We model this situation as a two-stage Stack-
elberg game and we solve it by backward induction starting from the second stage, where a representative
non-coordinating country chooses its mitigation level by minimizing
min
mIj
cIj =
{ω
2
(n−mIj − npmC −MI−j)2 − (n−mIj − npmC −MI−j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +
θ
2
a2Ij
}
.
As in Section 3.1, the reaction function of a representative non-coordinating country is given by
mPLrIj
(
mC , AI , aIj
)
=
nω
nqω + 1
− npω
nqω + 1
mC +
ω
nqω + 1
AI − aIj ,
and total mitigation by non-coordinating countries is then
MPLrI (mC , AI) =
n2qω − n2pqωmC −AI
nqω + 1
.
A representative coordinating country, acting as a leader, anticipates the follower’s reaction function and, in
its second-stage mitigation game, solves
min
mC
cC =
{ω
2
(
n− npmC −MPLrI (mC , AI)
)2 − (n− npmC −MPLrI (mC , AI)) aC + 12m2C + θ2a2C
}
.
Its best response, given by
mPLrC (aC , AI) =
n2pω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2 −
np (nqω + 1)
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2 aC +
npω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2AI ,
presents similar features as the case without leadership.
The subgame-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium in mitigation is
mPLsC (aC , AI) =
n2pω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2
− np (nqω + 1)
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2 aC +
npω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2AI (14)
mPLsIj (aC , AI , aIj) =
(nqω + 1)nω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2
+
n2p2ω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2 aC +
(nqω + 1)ω
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2AI − aIj
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and the corresponding total emissions are given by
EPLs (aC , AI) =
n (nqω + 1) + n2p2aC + (nqω + 1)AI
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2 . (15)
We observe that, as in the case without leadership, adaptation as a prior investment can be used strategically
to influence mitigation policies.
Moving to the first stage of the sequential game, the equilibrium mitigation levels (14) and (15) are taken
into account by each non-coordinating country, which selects its investment in adaptive measures by solving
min
aIj
cIj =
{
ω
2
(
EPLs (aC , AI)
)2 − (EPLs (aC , AI)) aIj + 1
2
(
mPLsIj (aC , AI , aIj)
)2
+
θ
2
a2Ij
}
,
which gives the best response function
aPLrI (aC) =
(ω + 1)
(
X + (Y + 1)
2 − ω (Y + 1)
)
(nω (Y + 1) +XaC)
ω
((
X + (Y + 1)
2
)(
θ
(
X + (Y + 1)
2
)
− nq (Y + 1)
)
+ (X + (Y + 1) (Y − ω))W
)
where constants X, Y and W are defined in (10)-(12). If collaborating countries increase their expenditures
on adaptive measures, non-collaborating countries react by doing the same.
We then have
EPLr (aC) =
(nω (Y + 1) +XaC) (U + θG)
H
mPLrC (aC) = np
(
aC (−ωU +G (Y − θω (Y + 1))) + nω2 (U + θG)
H
)
mPLrI (aC) =
H +W (ω + 1) (ω (Y + 1)−G)
GH
(nω (Y + 1) +XaC)
where
H =
(
θωG2 + ωWU − Y G (Y + 1))
U = (X + (Y + 1) (Y − ω))
G =
(
(Y + 1)
2
+X
)
.
Finally, collaborating countries solve the optimization problem
min
aC
cC =
{
ω
2
(
EPLr (aC)
)2 − (EPLr (aC)) aC + 1
2
(
mPLrC (aC)
)2
+
θ
2
a2C
}
and the solution of the whole game is then
aPLC =
nω2 (U + θG) ((Y + 1)H −XY (G+ ωU))
K2
aPLI =
nω (ω + 1) (XY (G+ ωU)− θω (Y + 1)H) (ω (Y + 1)−G)
K2
mPLC = n
2pω2 (U + θG)
−ωUW + Y G (Y + 1) + θω (H −G2)
K2
mPLI = nω
(H +W (ω + 1) (ω (Y + 1)−G)) (θωH (Y + 1)−XY (G+ ωU))
K2G
where
K2 =
(
θω
(
H2 − θωXG3)+X (ω2U2 (X + 1) + Y 2G2 − 2ωU (H + Y G))) .
A comparison between leading coordinators and following individualists shows that, when adaptation is a
prior investment, a collaborating leader country always adapts less than does a non-collaborating follower
country, which is the opposite of what is found with prior adaptive investments and no leadership. The
comparison of mitigation expenditures and overall environmental costs shows ambiguous results.
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4.2 Adaptation as a concurrent investment
In this section adaptation and mitigation are decided on at the same time; however, non-coordinating coun-
tries’ choices for both policies are anticipated by coordinating players. The reaction of a non-coordinating
country to an announcement by the leaders is obtained by solving (13), which yields
mSLrI (mC) =
n (θω − 1) (1− pmC)
θ + nq (θω − 1)
aSLrI (mC) =
n (1− pmC)
θ + nq (θω − 1) .
It is important to highlight that, as in the game without leadership, non-coordinators’ mitigation choices are
not affected by what is announced by the leaders in terms of their adaptation policy. Even when coordi-
nating countries are leaders, adaptation has no strategic effect on non-coordinators’ decisions. Adaptation
expenditures are still a proportion of the total emissions. However, if leaders declare that they will increase
their mitigation levels, followers will respond by reducing their effort in both environmental policies.
These reactions are anticipated by the coordinating countries, whose optimization problem is given by
min
mC ,aC
cC =
{ω
2
(
n− npmC − nqmSLrI (mC)
)2 − (n− npmC − nqmSLrI (mC)) aC + 12m2C + θ2a2C
}
yielding
aSLC = n
θ + nq (θω − 1)
θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2
mSLC =
θn2p (θω − 1)
θ2
(
n2p2ω + (nqω + 1)
2
)
− θn (2q (nqω + 1) + np2) + n2q2
.
The solution of the whole game is:
aSLC = a
SL
I = n
θ + nq (θω − 1)
θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2
mSLC =
θn2p (θω − 1)
θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2
mSLI =
n (θ − nq + θnqω) (θω − 1)
θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2
ESL = θn
θ + nq (θω − 1)
θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2
cSLC =
θn2 (θω − 1)
2 (θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2)
cSLI =
n2 (θω − 1) (θ + θω − 1) (θ + nq (θω − 1))2
2 (θ ((nqω + 1) (θ (nqω + 1)− 2nq) + n2p2 (θω − 1)) + n2q2)2 .
A comparison between coordinating and non-coordinating countries shows that, as in the no-leadership case,
both types of countries behave in the same way in terms of adaptation. For all the other variables, we derive
ambiguous results.
5 Singular type cases
In this section we specialize our previous results to three singular type cases, namely: when all countries are
collaborators (p = 1), which corresponds to the first best solution; when all countries act individualistically
(q = 1) and adaptation is a prior investment; and when all countries act individualistically (q = 1) and
adaptation and mitigation decisions are concurrent.
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5.1 First best solution
In the first best solution, the timing of decisions does not matter, as all countries coordinate their actions,
nobody is behaving strategically and all countries solve the joint optimization problem. The solution of this
cooperative game is given by
aC1 =
n
θ + n2 (θω − 1)
mC1 = n
2 θω − 1
θ + n2 (θω − 1)
EC1 =
θn
θ + n2 (θω − 1)
cC1 =
(θω − 1)n2
2 (θ + n2 (θω − 1)) .
5.2 Adaptation as a prior investment without coordination
We now consider the case where no countries are collaborating (q = 1), and investments in adaptive measures
are committed to before the mitigation decisions. This means solving a two-stage game where countries decide
about their irreversible adaptation investments in the first stage and then choose their mitigation policy in
the second stage. The game is solved by backward induction and the equilibrium solution is given by
aPNI1 =
n (ω + 1) (−ω + nω + 1)
θ (nω + 1)
2 − nω (n− 1)− ω − n
mPNI1 =
n (θω − 1) (nω + 1)
θ (nω + 1)
2 − nω (n− 1)− ω − n
EPNI1 = n
θ (nω + 1) + ω (n− 1)
θ (nω + 1)
2 − n− ω − nω (n− 1)
cPNI1 =
1
2
n2 (ω + 1) (θω − 1)
θ (nω + 1)
2
+ ω
(
ω (n− 1)2 − 1
)
− 1(
θ (nω + 1)
2 − n− ω − nω (n− 1)
)2 .
5.3 Adaptation as a concurrent investment without coordination
We finally consider the case where no countries are collaborating (q = 1) and adaptation and mitigation
levels are established simultaneously. The solution of the game is given by
mSNI1 =
n (θω − 1)
θ + n (θω − 1)
aSNI1 =
n
θ + n (θω − 1)
ESNI1 =
θn
θ + n (θω − 1)
cSNI1 =
n2 (θω − 1) (θ + θω − 1)
2 (θ − n+ θnω)2 .
A comparison among the three singular type cases shows that
cPNI1 > c
SN
I1 > cC1
aPNI1 > a
SN
I1 > aC1
mPNI1 < m
SN
I1 < mC1
EPNI1 > E
SN
I1 > EC1,
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which means that, if all countries act individualistically and investments in adaptation are decided on before
mitigation levels, countries suffer the highest environmental cost. This is due to the fact that, when decision
about adaptation measures are made before mitigation levels are selected, countries use their investments in
self-protective measures strategically, so that, by reducing their vulnerability to climate change effects, they
can mitigate less. A better option in terms of environmental cost is to carry out adaptation and mitigation
efforts simultaneously, which implies smaller adaptive expenditures and a greater mitigation effort.
6 Results
In this section we assess the impact of commitment and of the timing of adaptive investments for the mixed
case with collaborators and individualists. The results are based both on analytical proofs and numerical
investigations. We develop our evaluation by first looking at the aggregate of countries and then at each
single group.
Starting from the global environmental cost, we confirm the result found for the singular type cases: in
the mixed case with collaborators and individualists, committing to adaptation decisions before deciding on
mitigation levels generates the highest overall environmental cost, and a better outcome is achieved when
the two environmental policies are established simultaneously.
cC1 < c
SN < cPN .
This is an important result, as it qualifies the AR5 statement about adaptation and mitigation as com-
plementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change, by noting that to achieve
efficient results, these strategies should be established simultaneously. The relationships found for the total
environmental cost also hold for the aggregate level of adaptation and for total pollution emissions.
aC1 < a
SN < aPN
EC1 < E
SN < EPN .
Analyzing individual performances by country in terms of environmental cost, the results obtained for the
aggregate group of countries are also true for collaborating countries, that is, simultaneous decisions about
adaptation and mitigation yield a greater environmental cost compared to the first best solution, while this
cost is still lower than when adaptation is a prior commitment:
cC1 < c
SN
C < c
PN
C .
The result is slightly different for the individualist countries. Indeed, no matter how they time adaptive
investments, individualistic countries can outperform the first best solution in some cases, namely when there
is a relatively large number of coordinating countries. This happens because coordinators choose aggressive
environmental policies that allow non-coordinating countries to free-ride and be in a better position than
in the first best solution. However, it is still the case for non-collaborators that committing to adaptive
investments before deciding about mitigation policies always achieves a worse result.
cC1 ≷ cSNI
cC1 ≷ cPNI
cSNI < c
PN
I .
Moving to the individual equilibrium decisions, and starting with the adaptation levels, the results found
in the aggregate case are confirmed for both individualists and collaborators, all of which assign too many
resources to adaptive measures with respect to the first best solution, more so when adaptation requires a
prior investment:
aC1 < a
SN
C < a
PN
C
aC1 < a
SN
I < a
PN
I .
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Continuing with mitigation decisions, we find that, in some cases, collaborators may curtail their emissions
more than in the first best solution, for both types of adaptive investment. This occurs when the mitigation
cost coefficient γM is large compared to the environmental sensitivity γI . In other words, coordinating
countries mitigate more than in the first best solution when mitigation is relatively expensive. This is an
interesting result since collaborators always adapt more than in the first best solution; the coexistence with
individualistic countries may push collaborating countries to inefficiently high levels of emission reductions,
even with a higher adaptation investment.
mC1 ≷ mSNC
mC1 ≷ mPNC .
On the other hand, non-collaborators always mitigate less than under the first best solution, regardless of
the timing of adaptive investments:
mC1 > m
SN
I
mC1 > m
PN
I .
We now compare the mitigation level under the two assumptions about the nature of adaptation. Collabo-
rating countries always mitigate less when adaptation investments are selected before the mitigation levels,
compared to when both policies are established at the same time. This is due to a strategic effect: when
adaptation is timed before mitigation, countries adapt more, they become less vulnerable to the effects of
climate change and, as a consequence, they mitigate less:
mSNC > m
PN
C .
However, this strategic effect is not always confirmed for non-collaborating countries. Indeed, pre-committing
to some adaptive measures brings a larger mitigation effort from non-collaborating countries if the two
following conditions are satisfied:
ω >
n2p2 + nq − 1
n2p2 (np− 1) (np+ 1) (nq − 1)
θ >
n2p2
(
(np− 1) (np+ 1) (n2p2ω + 1) (nq − 1) + n4p2q2ω)
(n2p2ω + nqω + 1) (n2p2ω (np− 1) (np+ 1) (nq − 1) + 1− n2p2 − nq) .
Finally, we also find that some level of collaboration is always beneficial, no matter the type of adaptive
investment. That is, the global environmental cost c, the aggregate level of adaptation a and the total
pollution emissions E are always less in the mixed case than when there are only individualists. In addition,
non-collaborating countries suffer a lower individual environmental cost, invest fewer resources in adaptation
and mitigate less when the two types of countries coexist than when they all act individually.
When we repeat the same type of analysis under the assumption that collaborating countries become
leaders in responding to climate change and individualistic countries act as followers, many of the previously
found results become ambiguous. However, we find at the aggregate level, under the leadership assumption,
that timing adaptation decisions simultaneously with the mitigation ones causes a greater overall aggregate
environmental cost compared to the first best solution, but this cost is still lower than when adaptation
investments are decided on before the mitigation levels.
cC1 < c
SL < cPL.
From the above we can again conclude that simultaneous investments in adaptation and mitigation give rise
to more efficient policies than do prior commitments in adaptation.
In our last set of results we compare the equilibrium solutions with and without leadership, in the case
where adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously. Our findings can be summarized as
follows:
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mSNC > m
SL
C m
SN
I < m
SL
I
ESN < ESL
aSNC < a
SL
C a
SN
I < a
SL
I
cSNC > c
SL
C c
SN
I < c
SL
I
cSN < cSL.
For this type of adaptation, we find that coordinating countries, by becoming first movers and anticipating the
followers’ reaction, mitigate less and push the followers to mitigate more than in a game without leadership.
This yields a higher total pollution and greater expenditures in adaptation for both types of countries, since
adaptation is a proportion of the total pollution. In terms of individual performance, leaders are better off,
suffering a lower overall environmental cost, and followers are worse off. At the aggregate level, the overall
environmental cost is greater with leadership than without leadership. This is an important result because it
suggests that leadership is not globally efficient; however, it would be convenient to a group of collaborating
countries (e.g. Annex I Parties) to make the first move.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a model where countries minimize their environmental cost by adopting two envi-
ronmental policies, namely, mitigation and adaptation, with the objective of understanding the implications
of different decision sequences for these policies.
One of the main results of our analysis is that the highest environmental cost suffered by countries always
occurs when investments in adaptation are committed to before any decisions about mitigation levels are
made (this is true in the singular type cases, in the mixed case at the aggregate level and at the individual
level for both individualistic and collaborating countries, with and without leadership). As a consequence,
simultaneous investments in adaptive and mitigating measures seem to be the best way to answer the problem
of the effects of climate change. This is an important result because it reinforces the message stated in the
AR5, while adding that the complementary environmental policies should be carried out at the same time,
with a unified approach.
Another important observation is that when adaptation requires an investment prior to any mitigation
arrangement, adaptation can be used strategically, that is, countries can allocate greater resources to adap-
tation and self-protection so that they can save on mitigation efforts, compared to the case where decisions
are made simultaneously.
Finally, we showed that with simultaneous investments in adaptive and mitigating measures, having some
countries taking leadership in responding to the effects of climate change is not beneficial at an aggregate
level. This contrasts with what has been done for the promotion of international environmental agreements,
with the distinction between Annex I and No-Annex I countries. However, from an individual point of view,
countries that become leaders are able to lower their overall cost, so that it is in the interest of collaborating
countries to take a first step in countering the effects of climate change.
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